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McKee: Judges as Umpires

JUDGES AS UMPIRES
Theodore A. McKee*

I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article, "Judges as Umpires" was inspired by the Senate
Judiciary hearings on the nomination of John Roberts to be Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court, and the metaphor was again invoked during the
hearings on the nomination of my former colleague, Samuel Alito, to be
an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.
In his testimony before the Senate Judiciary, Committee, Chief
Justice Roberts ushered a new metaphor into the legal lexicon when he
proclaimed: "Judges are like umpires. Umpires don't make the rules,
they apply them. The role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They
make sure everybody plays by the rules .... ."' That metaphor is helpful
insofar as it conveys the idea that judges must render decisions based
upon guiding legal principles rather than their view of policy, or a desire
to achieve a given result.
Although I doubt that few in the public appreciate it, judges often
render decisions that achieve a result they do not like and enforce laws
they do not agree with. Indeed, anyone who has been a judge for any
length of time has most certainly been placed in the difficult position of
doing just that. It is not something we like to do, but it is something that
we do routinely regardless of the level of personal difficulty.
To the extent that viewing judges as umpires helps inform the
public about that aspect of the court system, it serves a somewhat useful,
although limited, purpose. In the context in which Chief Justice Roberts
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. I would like to thank
everyone involved with planning the Hofstra University Kaplan Lecture Series, from which this
Article was adopted. I particularly want to thank Dean Demleitner, for extending the invitation, and
Professor Lane whom I suspect to be one of the primary conspirators responsible for the invitation.
1. Confirmation Hearingon the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be ChiefJustice of the
United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of John G.
Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the United States).
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used the metaphor, it did convey that fundamental concept to the general
public.
Nevertheless, the metaphor has more profound implications and
that is clearly the context in which it was offered and it is the context in
which it is usually invoked. I realize, of course, that the confirmation
hearings of both Chief Justice Roberts and Associate Justice Alito were
largely theater and that the metaphor was offered in that context.
However, the metaphor has become accepted as a kind of shorthand for
judicial "best practices," that obscures a complex dynamic that is far
more amorphous, elusive and troublesome than its simplistic appeal
suggests.
In the first place, judges may not be able to systematically decide
cases based upon objective application of a set of rules because judges
may not agree on what the rules are. Those familiar with capital habeas
practice will appreciate the difficulty judges and lawyers can sometimes
have trying to decide if a particular scheme of capital punishment
reflects a weighing statute, or a non-weighing statute. The answer to that
question is not always apparent, yet it can quite literally determine if
someone lives or dies.
We have all heard a great deal about judicial activism and
legislating from the bench, and the umpire metaphor was clearly
intended to mitigate concerns about a judicial nominee's tendency to
overturn or ignore legislation.
However, we have now been saddled with an image of judges who
are able to ignore the many kinds of bias that affect everyone else and
discharge their duties in a mechanical manner that is removed from the
society and its many forces.
In fact, one former judge who appeared as a witness in support of
then Judge Alito, referred to being transformed upon becoming a judge.
The witness suggested that, ascending to the bench both required and
enabled judges to decide cases without being swayed by bias or
personal, ideological, or political leanings. 2 This portrait of the judiciary
merits a great deal more analysis and discussion than it has received.
Each of us, be we student, teacher, lawyer, judge or just thoughtful
participant in the democratic process, is a product of social, cultural and
2. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th

Cong. 655-56 (2006) (statement of Edward R. Becker, Senior Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania) ("When you take that judicial oath, you become a
different person. You decide cases not to reach the result that you would like, but based on what the

facts and the law command.").
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economic forces that shape us in many different ways and pull us in
many different directions. We are aware of some of these influences, but
each of us is also the product of social forces that we are unaware of that
are even more powerful, more enduring, and I believe often far more
insidious than the forces we are aware of and can therefore guard
against.
As I hope to explain, given the forces upon each of us as
individuals, professionals, and judges, it may be that the metaphor that
has come to symbolize the ideal of objective adjudication is actually
counterproductive because it assumes a reality that is based upon an
abstract principle rather than our every day reality.
The principle is a noble one indeed, and one that nearly all judges
aspire to; however, we do a real disservice to any thoughtful inquiry into
the role of judges by assuming that the principle is readily achievable.
Moreover, the public's readiness to embrace that metaphor may chill
honest discussion of the role of judges and thereby move us fartherfrom
the principle of objective adjudication rather than closer to it.
Moreover, there are some areas of the law, and some situations,
where detached and objective application of legal principles may
actually detract from, rather than add to, the quality of our jurisprudence.
I realize that this Article may be misinterpreted and that some may
understand this to mean that judges are comfortable with allowing
personal beliefs to shape their jurisprudence, or that I am comfortable
doing so. I cannot stress too strongly that is not the case.
A little later in this Article, I will discuss a few situations where
judges have very openly anguished over the conflict they felt between
legal principles they had to apply in a given case, and their own personal
beliefs. I believe these examples illustrate the possibility that there may
well be situations where we can only achieve objective jurisprudence by
first recognizing the conflict between personal beliefs and legal precepts
and proceeding accordingly, rather than simply relying upon the
appealing, but anesthetizing metaphor.
I hope the examples will also illustrate that, in certain situations, the
tension between personal belief and textual mandate can actually
advance the quality and durability of our jurisprudence.
II.

JUDGES AS UMPIRES

As Professor Neil Siegel of Duke University College of Law
explains in a soon to be published article in which he analyzes the
umpire metaphor against the backdrop of certain Supreme Court cases:
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"The Court sustains its institutional legitimacy over the long run not by
pursuing the impossible task of simply applying 'the rules,' but by
articulating a vision of social order that resonates with fundamental
public values." 3
Professor Siegel argues that the Constitution is far more than a legal
document.4 He concludes that it is a kind of national prose that is woven
into the fabric of our society and our institutions.5
That view does far more to explain the post-depression overruling
of the Lochner era, as well as the sea change of such landmark cases as
7
Gideon v. Wainwright6 and Brown v. Board of Education; cases that
could well be viewed as wrongly decided if jurisprudence was merely
the mechanical application of text and precedent.
However, even that view is not entirely satisfying because it does
not address what I think is the fundamental misconception that the entire
metaphor for objectivity rests upon. The umpire metaphor obscures the
reality of personal bias. Getting beyond that bias is extremely difficult
even for the most introspective and sincere judge. I submit that we will
never get beyond it if we do not allow for the certainty that each of us
harbors some bias in some degree, and that our bias may be impacting a
given decision in ways in which we are simply not aware.
A story that Nelson Mandela reveals in his autobiography, Long
Walk To Freedom,8 illustrates the point and exemplifies the tenacious
tentacles of bias and the extent to which it can cloud our objectivity.
Mandela tells of how he was smuggled out of South Africa while
resisting the apartheid regime so that he could attend a meeting that was
to be held in Africa, outside of his native country. 9 He recounts how
relieved he was upon finally reaching the landing strip where an airplane
awaited his arrival to fly him to the location of the meeting.' 0 As he
relaxed in his seat he saw that the flight crew, including the pilot was
Black, and he tells of how he was instantly seized with fear knowing that
his life depended upon a Black pilot's ability to fly an airplane.1 1 It was
not until that moment, he reveals, that he fully understood the extent to
3.

Neil Siegel, Umpires at Bat: On Integration and Legitimation, CONST. COMMENT.

(forthcoming 2007).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6.
7.
8.

372 U.S. 335 (1963).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
NELSON MANDELA, LONG WALK TO FREEDOM (1995).

9. Id. at 292.
10. Id.
11.

Id.
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which racism had seeped into even his view of humanity.' 2 Once he
realized this, he resisted his initial urge to get off the plane and go
home. 13
As powerful as that story is, the findings of a study that was
recently conducted here in the United States may illustrate the power of
subliminal bias in a context that has a more obvious correlation to the
kind of disputes that come before judges.
The February 3, 2007 issue of New Scientist reported a study that
was conducted by Joni Hersch, a professor of law and economics at
Vanderbilt University Law School. 14 She analyzed a 2003 government
survey of over 2000 recent immigrants from various countries whose
skin tones were rated on an eleven-point scale during interviews. 5 After
controlling for fluency in English, education, occupation, previous work
experience and country of origin, she found that immigrants with the
lightest skin earned an average of eight to fifteen percent more than
those with much darker skin.' 6 Each extra point of lightness on the scale
was roughly equivalent to one extra year of education in terms of salary
increase. 17
She also found that taller immigrants earned more than their shorter
cohorts even after all identifiable variables such as education, skin color,
skill, experience and country were controlled for. 18 In fact, she found
that each inch of height advantage translated into one percent more
income. 19

I mention this study and Mandela's recounting of his own
realization of the racist deceit hidden deep within him to illustrate the
difficulty of divorcing ourselves and our decisions from the infinite array
of images and forces that begin to shape each of us the day we are born.
I doubt very much if any of the employers in Professor Hersch's study
were aware that their assessment of the skill, productivity and labor of
their employees was affected by such seemingly irrelevant factors as
skin color or height. Yet, that is what her study found.2 °
I assume you will agree that Mandela's epiphany and Professor
Hersch's study are disturbing, but I want to relate one more story which
12.
13.
14.

Id.
Id.
The Money of Colour,NEW SCIENTIST, Feb. 3, 2007, at 6.

15.
16.

Id.
Id.

17.

Id.

18.

Id.

19.

Id.

20. See id.
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will convey more directly how subliminal forces impact judges. Several
years ago I was chair of the Pennsylvania Sentencing Commission.
During my tenure as Chair, the Commission attempted to reassess
sentences that were recommended in the lower range of the state
sentencing guidelines in order to facilitate sentencing to boot camps and
to encourage alternative sanctions that were being proposed as part of
then pending legislation.
While the legislation was pending, a trial judge from one of the
rural counties in Pennsylvania explained his support for the legislation
by saying that he would no longer have to send the residents of his
county to that prison outside of Philadelphia that housed all those
criminals. He was referring to the State Correctional Institution at
Graterford-a prison on the outskirts of Philadelphia whose inmate
population is largely Black and Latino.2'
There may be other explanations for his remark, but it is hard for
me not to conclude that he viewed the people from his predominately
White and rural county who were convicted of serious crimes differently
than he viewed people who resided in the disadvantaged enclaves of
Philadelphia who were convicted of the same crimes. And I hope that
you are as equally troubled by the implications for class, caste and racial
bias implicit in his comments as I am.
We should all be concerned that similar subconscious distinctions
may affect sentences in our criminal courts. This is particularly
problematic when a suggested sentence falls at the margins of a
particular guideline and the judge has more discretion about the range of
sentences. Or where the suggested sentences include both a custodial
and a noncustodial sentence. In those cases, objectivity may not be much
of a match for the social lenses that shape the image of the suburban
middle class defendant differently than his or her economically
disadvantaged cohort.
The state judge's comments, Professor Hersch's study, and Nelson
Mandela's epiphany all illustrate in varying degrees the extent to which
our decisions are influenced by bias that we are not even aware of. If
bias can cloud the vision of Nelson Mandela and cause him to accept the
teaching that Blacks are less capable than Whites, I submit that none of
us is immune from its poisonous sting, a sting which often we cannot
even feel and are therefore not aware of. Moreover, if we are to rise
21. See DAVID BARTON SMITH, Fox SCH. OF BUS. & MGMT., TEMP. U., AN INDEPENDENT
ASSESSMENT OF THE HEALTH, HUMAN SERVICES, CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL NEEDS OF
(2006), http://www.mcfoundationinc.org/pdfs/Montco-_Needs20
COUNTY
MONTGOMERY

Asses.pdf.
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above the social and economic tethers that bind us, we must first
recognize and confront the difficulty of escaping the nuanced messages
that have rained down upon each of us since we first drew breath.
As I suggested earlier, I doubt that we can begin to approach the
ideal of objective analysis unless we first recognize our human frailties,
and admit that we are as vulnerable to society's messages as everyone
else. We judges must resist the temptation to assume that we are beyond
the reach of the forces that shape the mindsets and beliefs of our nonjurist peers.
There is, of course, something special and unique about the role and
responsibilities of judges in any society that values the dignity of the
individual and the rule of law. And this is certainly true in a system that
values the independence of the judiciary as much as our legal system
professes to. Therefore, I am not suggesting that judges engage in
jurisprudence that undermines the respect the society must have for the
courts, or that we rest our jurisprudence on foundations that cause
reasonable observers to question our impartiality. I am suggesting that
we judges can best fulfill our noble role by admitting and confronting
our vulnerabilities and frailties rather than proclaiming that, unlike
everyone else, we can rise above them because of the demands of our
high office.
In the final analysis, judicial objectivity can not be achieved unless
we judges recognize that we have been exposed to the same social
afflictions as everyone else, and that our immunity may be no stronger
than anyone else's.
Harvard University Professor of Psychology Daniel Gilbert may
have said it best when he wrote the following in an Op-Ed article in the
New York Times: "[J]udges... strive for truth more often than we
realize, and miss that mark more often than they realize. Because the
brain cannot see itself fooling itself ....
Viewing judges merely as objective umpires chills the very
introspection required to achieve a more objective jurisprudence.
Consequently, it becomes more difficult to achieve the kind of
objectivity we should all want in our judges and our jurisprudence. This
is true for several, fairly obvious, reasons.
First, the politicized and polarized climate of recent years has made
it exceedingly difficult for anyone engaged in the discussion to look
critically at the jurisprudence that characterizes "their side" of an issue.

22.

Daniel Gilbert, Op-Ed., I'm O.K., You're Biased, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2006, § 4, at 12.
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Rather, persons on both sides of the "judicial activism divide" throw
accusatory stones at those on the other side of the divide.
The phrase "judicial activism" is itself as unfortunate as it is
meaningless because it offers little more than reflexive criticism and
convenient sound bites. More importantly, the increasingly polarized
climate surrounding the courts makes it extremely difficult for us judges
to admit either publicly or privately that we are the product of our
experiences, and burdened by human frailties like all other mortals. We
are, perhaps, too concerned that admitting this will call our own
jurisprudence and judicial fitness into question, thereby making our
judgments suspect, and opening us to criticism that we are not at liberty
to rebut. Given the political posturing surrounding the hot-button issues
of the day, that concern is not without substantial justification.
Yet, I submit that if we take a second to think about the kinds of
decisions judges are often required to make, we might agree that, at least
in some cases, legal analysis not only allows for personal beliefs to
impact our jurisprudence, it sometimes requires it. One popular legal
observer has stated:
[C]onscientious judges recognizes [sic] a clear distinction between
judicial interpretation and imposing personal preferences. Thus, in
interpreting the Constitution, they invoke text, structure, history, and
precedent as crucial guides. But by the same token, it is pretense to
suggest that judges can somehow compartmentalize-and then
ignore-their own values when choosing among interpretive methods
and results.
As we consider the umpire metaphor, it is also important to
remember that the vast majority of cases will result in unanimous
agreement among the judges deciding the case as well as the different
courts that may consider the issue. In our court, as in all of the courts of
appeals, the vast majority of appeals result in unanimous decisions either
to affirm or to reverse.
From the judicial perspective, the vast majority of these cases are
fairly clear cut, relatively easy to resolve, and usually involve none of
today's hot-button issues where personal values may have a greater
tendency to affect one's jurisprudence. As a former federal prosecutor
explained:

23. Edward Lazarus, Overall, The Miers Nomination Is Troubling-But It Does Have One
Virtue, FINDLAW, Oct. 13, 2005, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/lazarus/20051013.html.
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For the most part, today's intense debate over the proper role of the
courts-that is, the debate over judicial activism-focuses on a small
number of Supreme Court decisions. This is unfortunate, because the
lower federal courts decide far more seemingly unremarkable civil
cases that matter a great deal for understanding when judges overreach.
Unlike the cases that capture everyone's attention, these cases turn not
on vexing issues of constitutional interpretation, but rather on how the
the lawsuit should be weighed-and on who should weigh
facts of
4
2

them.

Moreover, even when cases do involve "vexing issues of
constitutional interpretation, 25 the facts and law are often so clear that
there is little room for a judge's personal view to impact his or her
decision.
However, I think we should candidly admit that there are other
instances where there is enough play in the factual or precedential joints
to allow personal beliefs to affect our adjudication. I do not say that this
is a good thing, but I do believe it is unavoidable, and that our
jurisprudence will be strengthened by admitting this dynamic rather than
denying its existence. In fact, the quote from Professor Siegel that I
shared earlier explains how this subjectivity has enriched our
evolution from "separate but equal" to
jurisprudence and furthered its
26
Education.
of
Board
v.
Brown
Although there is clearly a danger in allowing subjectivity to
impact jurisprudence, as I suggested at the outset, some legal inquiries
can only be resolved by judges relying upon personal experience,
background and belief.
One legal commentator has argued that such issues as whether a
search or seizure is "reasonable," whether a given governmental purpose
is "compelling," whether a given punishment is "cruel and unusual," and
I would add whether a given governmental act or omission "shocks the
conscience"-are but a few examples of areas where it is difficult, if not
impossible, for a judge's ruling to be divorced from his or her own
personal experiences.27 I note that the same is true with regard to
whether a particular set of circumstances reflect conduct that is so severe
and pervasive that it evidences an objectively hostile or abusive work

24. Seth Rosenthal, The Jury Snub: A Conservative Form ofJudicial Activism, SLATE, Dec.
18, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2155723.

25. Id.
26.
27.

See Siegel, supra note 3 and accompanying text.
See Lazarus, supra note 23.
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environment for purposes of employment discrimination under Title
VII.28
Each of these inquiries opens the door to the judge's values and
beliefs. Yet, it is neither possible nor desirable to attempt to apply these
doctrines in a sterilized manner that isolates the judge's decision from
the judge's experiences. After all, how else could the terms have
meaning. These terms are not absolute; they have no meaning in the
abstract.
First Amendment jurisprudence is another, and more highly
charged, example of this. Whether we advocate original intent or
subscribe to the notion that the Constitution is a living and evolving
document, proper resolution of many free speech issues requires a judge
to rely upon his or her view of the extent
to which certain material
29
offends contemporary standards of decency.
It just may be that the rulings of even the most respected jurists
differ on such issues because they have different experiences, and
different frames of reference, and therefore view the relevant legal
authority through different lenses.
Yet, I submit that the strong independent judiciary guaranteed
under the Constitution comes about as close to constructing a system of
objective jurisprudence as is humanly possible. It may be impossible to
construct a system of law that would not allow, and perhaps occasionally
even invite, subjectivity into the decision-making process. I submit that
doing so, even if possible, is not as desirable as would appear given the
politically charged discourse of the day.
Judge Harry Edwards, former Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals, has observed:
While a judge typically will not need to resort to personal beliefs in
deciding cases, some consideration of these beliefs may be
unavoidable in the occasional "very hard" case where the legal
arguments are indeterminate. In such a case, a judge's informed and
critical development of his beliefs is a prerequisite to intelligent
resolution of the dispute. Further, in all cases, the nature of one's
personal beliefs should be consciously, rather than subconsciously,
recognized.3 °

28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
29. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30-32 (1973) (approving a standard whereby "triers
of fact are asked to decide whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community
standards' would consider certain materials 'prurient').
30. Harry T. Edwards, The Role of a Judge in Modern Society: Some Reflections on Current
Practice in FederalAppellate Adjudication, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 385,409-10 (1983-84).
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Judge Edwards further explains, "The real threat that a judge's
personal ideologies may affect his decisions in an inappropriate case
arises when the judge is not even consciously aware of the potential
threat." 3
As I argued at the outset, we can never be fully aware of all that is
percolating beneath the surface of our consciousness. We must therefore
admit the very real possibility that our subjective beliefs may even
define the seemingly objective application of neutral principles of law.
However, as Professor Siegel suggests, that is not necessarily bad.32 That
may just be a jurisprudential dynamic that allows the law to evolve with
changing times. The danger, of course, is that the parameter of judges'
subjective view of the law is no parameter at all. It does not define a
principled way of resolving legal disputes or interpreting legal texts.
Yet, I believe our jurisprudence has often been strengthened by frank
discussion of subjective beliefs in the context of a particular case or
controversy.
I realize there is also danger here because it is very easy to applaud
judicial expressions of personal belief that one agrees with as enriching
jurisprudence, while viewing expressions of belief one disagrees with as
the boogeyman of judicial activism. However, that is not as dangerous as
our continuing to delude ourselves into thinking that our decisions are
solely the result of our objective application of neutral legal principles,
and that we judges have the ability to rise above ourselves.
Rather than indulging the pretense that judges are umpires and that
umpires merely "call'um as they see'um," we should accept the fact that
the law is flexible enough and strong enough to accommodate a far more
honest approach to adjudication.
Perhaps one of the best examples of this tension between personal
belief and adherence to neutral legal principles is Justice Blackmun's
rather public attempts to reconcile the death penalty with the limitations
of the Eighth Amendment. In his dissenting opinion in Furman v.
Georgia, in 1972, responding to the majority's decision to strike down
Georgia's death penalty statute, he explained: "I yield to no one in the
depth of my distaste, antipathy, and, indeed, abhorrence, for the death
penalty .... Although personally I may rejoice at the Court's result, I
as a matter of history, of law, or of
find it difficult to accept or to justify
33
pronouncement."
constitutional

31.
32.

Id. at410.
See Siegel, supranote 3 and accompanying text.

33.

408 U.S. 238, 405, 414 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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As we know, several years later, Justice Blackmun reversed that
stance and consistently voted to strike down death penalty statutes as
unconstitutional. Thus, in 1994, in Callins v. Collins, he proclaimed:
From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of
death. For more than 20 years I have endeavored-indeed, I have
struggled-along with a majority of this Court, to develop procedural
and substantive rules that would lend more than the mere appearance
of fairness to the death penalty endeavor. Rather than continue to
coddle the Court's delusion that the desired level of fairness has been
achieved and the need for regulation eviscerated, I feel morally and
intellectually obligated simply to concede that the death penalty
experiment has failed. It is virtually self-evident to me now that no
combination of procedural rules or substantive regulations ever can
save the death penalty from its inherent constitutional deficiencies.

...The problem is that the inevitability of factual, legal, and moral
error gives us a system that we know must wrongly kill some
defendants, a system that fails to deliver the fair, consistent, and
reliable sentences of death required by the Constitution.34

One can certainly view Justice Blackmun's attack on the death
penalty as being beyond the bounds of objective, textually based
jurisprudence. One can also view his statement in Callins v. Collins as
consistent with the guiding principle of evolving standards of decency
that is now enshrined in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and conclude
that his expression of personal belief was an appropriate part of the
the
Court's constitutional inquiry and discussion. It may yet impact 35
Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence if it hasn't already done so.
In the words of Professor Siegel, Justice Blackmun's
pronouncements "resolve an Eighth Amendment analysis in a manner
that articulated a vision of social order that resonated with fundamental
public values. 36

34.

510 U.S. 1141, 1145-46 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

35. In a question and answer session that followed my presentation of these remarks,
Professor Monroe H. Freedman, of Hofstra Law School, observed that Justice Blackmun's
statements in Callins v. Collins were based on equal protection and due process considerations. I do
not disagree with that interpretation of Justice Blackmun's analysis. Nevertheless, Justice
Blackmun's articulation of his objection to the death penalty relies upon moral and philosophical
(i.e., "intellectually obligated") considerations rather than the Fourteenth Amendment.
36. Siegel, supra note 3.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol35/iss4/3

12

McKee: Judges as Umpires
2007]

JUDGESAS UMPIRES

On my own court, in a 1995 case of Flamer v. Delaware, then
Judge Timothy Lewis referred approvingly to Justice Blackmun's
philosophical and oral challenge to the death penalty in a case involving
an appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of Delaware upholding
a death sentence.37 In his dissent in Flamer,Judge Lewis wrote:
To be sure, Justice Blackmun was correct .... [T]here are times when
it becomes appropriate for a judge to reflect upon the law that he or she
is called upon to apply, and to express views, genuine and unfeigned,
that reveal a sincere and earnest belief ... Something is terribly wrong
when a body of law upon which we rely to determine who lives and
who dies can no longer, in reality, reasonably and logically be
comprehended and applied; .... Yet this is how cluttered and
confusing our nation's effort to exact the ultimate punishment has
become. This cannot be what certain fundamental principles of liberty
and due process embodied in our Constitution... are all about.38
The dissents penned by Justice Blackmun and Judge Lewis are
examples of judges not merely calling balls and strikes. Rather, their
experience and sensitivity informed their resolution of the weighty legal
issues in the case before them.
I submit that our jurisprudence was enriched rather than retarded by
their very personal expressions of their own misgivings. In that regard, I
cite once more from Justice Blackmun in dissent, this time from
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, which
he wrote in 1989. 39 There, in explaining why he disagreed with the
majority's conclusion that the plaintiff had not established the state
action that was the condition precedent to establishing jurisdiction he
stated:
Today, the Court purports to be the dispassionate oracle of the law,
unmoved by "natural sympathy". But, in this pretense, the Court itself
retreats into a sterile formalism which prevents it from recognizing
either the facts of the case before it or the legal norms that should
apply to those facts.
... But such formalistic reasoning has no place in the interpretation of
the broad and stirring Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, I
submit that these Clauses were designed, at least in part, to
undo ... formalistic legal reasoning ....
... [T]he question presented by this case is an open one, and our
Fourteenth Amendment precedents may be read more broadly or
37.

68 F.3d 736, 772 (3d Cir. 1995) (Lewis, J., dissenting).

38. Id.
39. 489 U.S. 189, 212-13 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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narrowly depending upon how one chooses to read them. Faced with
the choice, I would adopt a "sympathetic" reading, one which
comports with dictates of fundamental justice and recognizes that
compassion need not be exiled from the province ofjudging.4 °

Justice Blackmun is expressing the old adage that where one comes
out depends in large part upon where one goes in. And where one goes
in has a great deal to do with the kind of subliminal forces that I
mentioned at the beginning of this Article.
In his book, Courts on Trial, while commenting on the extent to
which the values and life experiences of judges affect their
jurisprudence, the late Judge Jerome Frank of the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals wrote: "Frankly to recognize the existence of such prejudices
is the part of wisdom. The conscientious judge will, as far as possible,
make himself aware of his biases of this character, and, by that very selfknowledge, nullify their effect. 4 1 Although, I doubt we can truly ever be
confident that we have "nullified the effect of bias,"-particularly where
we remain ignorant of its presence, I do agree that we move closer to
that objective when we engage in the kind of self examination and
introspection Judge Frank was advocating.
Thus, the recent rush of accusations of "judicial activism," and
legislating from the bench only enhances the danger that we judges will
allow personal values and beliefs to impact our jurisprudence. This is
because it is increasingly difficult to engage in the kind of personal and
introspective inquiry exemplified by the dissents I have just referred to,
and the concerns expressed by Judge Frank.
Moreover, not withstanding analogies and metaphors of umpires
and balls and strikes, it is impractical to expect judicial decisions to be
exclusively controlled by the text of legislation or constitutional
provisions, and we should not delude ourselves into thinking that rigid
formalism necessarily advances our jurisprudence.
A popular legal commentator recently observed, quite correctly I
think:
All significant legislation is riddled with gaps that need to be filled in
by courts. While judges are guided in their "interstitial" lawmaking
function by what they perceive to be the intent of the legislature, it is
disingenuous to suggest that judges do not add content to the
frameworks provided by legislatures. Judges, of course, don't write

40.

Id. at 212-13 (citation omitted).

41.

JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 414

(1973) (quoting In re J.P. Linahan Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 652 (1943)).
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new law on a blank page, but they do write important law between the
lines of what legislatures have already written.42
Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone stated nearly seventy years ago:
[Olne of the evil features, a very evil one, about all this assumption
that judges only find the law and don't make it, often becomes the evil
of a lack of candor. By covering up the lawmaking function of judges,
we miseducate the people and fail to bring out into the open the real
responsibility ofjudges for what they do.43
Although Chief Justice Stone was referring to statutory
interpretation, his observation applies with even greater force to the far
more difficult task of interpreting the Constitution. 4
As I cautioned at the outset, I am not suggesting that we should rest
content knowing that judges are influenced by other than their objective
interpretation of neutral principles of law. I am suggesting that the
umpire metaphor has done a real disservice to the very kind of
jurisprudence it purports to advance.
III.

CONCLUSION

And now, I thought it might be helpful and help us better
understand how the umpire metaphor has dumbed down the public's
appreciation of the constitutional role of judges. Professor Siegel
45
reminds us of professional baseball's definition of a "strike.
The Official Rules of Major League Baseball define the strike zone
as follows:
The STRIKE ZONE is that area over home plate the upper limit of
which is a horizontal line at the midpoint between the top of the
shoulders and the top of the uniform pants, and the lower level is a line
at the hollow beneath the knee cap. The Strike Zone shall be
determined from the batter's stance as the batter is prepared to swing at
a pitched ball.46
It may be easier to apply First Amendment jurisprudence than
apply that definition. As Justice Potter Stewart observed in Jacobellis v.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Lazarus, supra note 23.
Id.
See id.
See Siegel, supra note 3.
Major
League
Baseball,

Official

Rules:

2.00

Definition
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http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/officialinfo/official_rules/definition-terms_2.jsp.
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Ohio, at least with pornography, you "know it when [you] see it."4 7 But
how does one determine the precise moment when a batter is prepared to
swing at a pitch?
And, what about the batter who wears his pants extremely high and
above the waist. Does he thereby gain an unfair advantage by narrowing
the strike zone as would be the case if the umpire interprets the rule
literally, or does the umpire apply the strike zone definition as it would
have existed had the batter worn his pants in the anticipated mannerclearly a policy decision based upon what the umpire believes the
drafters intended rather than what they actually said. What did the
framers of the definition intend?
In conclusion, I think it fair to say that the umpire metaphor would
be more accurate if, rather than proclaiming that we merely call balls
and strikes like an umpire, we recognize that the strike zone is actually
defined by the umpire who is calling the balls and strikes. Without that
realization the umpire metaphor resembles Shakespeare's poor player
who struts and frets his hour upon the stage telling tales that are full of
sound and fury that signify nothing.
I hope that this Article will stimulate more thoughtful discussions
about the role of judges and judges as individuals, and that they will not
be misinterpreted as advocating result-oriented jurisprudence. In sharing
these thoughts with you, I wanted to be as candid as possible even
though I realize the risk that some may conclude that I am not troubled
by the dynamic I have described. I am troubled by the fact that our
jurisprudence is shaped by personal beliefs, but I am more troubled by
pretending that judges can somehow become perfect objective
adjudicators at the flip of a switch, or the wearing of a robe.
Chief Justice Stone was right seventy years ago in describing that
assumption as "the evil of a lack of candor.... [that] miseducate[s] the
out into the open the real responsibility of
people and fail[s] to bring
48
judges for what they do.",

47. 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
48. Lazarus, supra note 23.
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